Eric Viola v. Borough of Throop by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-13-2011 
Eric Viola v. Borough of Throop 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Eric Viola v. Borough of Throop" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 75. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/75 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4739 
_____________ 
 
ERIC VIOLA, Police Officer,  
 
             Appellant 
 
   v. 
 
BOROUGH OF THROOP; TOM LUKASEWICZ, 
Individually and as Council President; STANLEY  
LUKOWSKI, Individually and as Mayor; NEIL FURIOSI, 
Individually and as Chief of Police; TONY CHAZAN,  
Individually and as Council President 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 06-cv-1930) 
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 22, 2011 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: December 13, 2011) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
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 Eric Viola brings his civil rights action before us for the second time.  In our first 
opinion, we affirmed the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment to the 
defendants
1
 on Viola’s First Amendment claim, but remanded for further proceedings on 
his due process claim.  On remand, ruling on cross-motions seeking summary judgment, 
the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Viola’s due 
process claim.  We will affirm the District Court’s decision.  
I.  Background Facts 
 We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential 
facts.  Viola, a police officer with the Borough of Throop, was suspended, with pay, 
effective June 9, 2006.
 2
  Following a hearing on July 11, 2006, Viola was suspended for 
10 days, without pay.  He sought redress for these suspensions through litigation. 
                                                 
1
 Defendants are the Borough of Throop, Tom Lukasewicz, Stanley Lukowski, 
Neil Furiosi, and Tony Chazan (collectively, “Defendants”). 
 
2
 Counsel insists that Viola’s initial suspension was without pay.  This claim is 
without foundation.  (See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 10 (“Here, there is no dispute Viola was 
suspended without pay . . . The fact that Throop ended up reversing its decision, does not 
wipe away the fact that the original suspension was without pay.”).)  The record is clear 
— the suspension initiated by the June 9, 2006 letter was with pay.  (Letter from Mayor 
Stanley Lukowski and Council President Thomas J. Lukasewicz to Officer Eric Viola 
(June 9, 2006), attached as exhibit 30B6G to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts as 
to Which No Genuine Issue Remains to be Tried (“The purpose of this correspondence is 
to notify you that you are hereby suspended with pay, effective immediately, from the 
Throop Police Department for neglect or violation of an official duty.”).)  An 
administrative error — deducting sick leave — subsequently corrected, does not convert 
that suspension with pay to one without pay.  More important, it does not create a 
constitutional violation.   
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II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We review the District Court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. Azur v. 
Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  “To that end, we are 
required to apply the same test the district court should have utilized initially.”  Chambers 
ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Further, “[w]e may affirm the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment on any grounds supported by the record.”  Nicini v. Morra, 
212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
III.  Analysis  
  On remand,
3
 the District Court followed our instructions, analyzed Viola’s due 
process claim in light of our decision in Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225 (3d 
Cir. 2008), and applied the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
The District Court’s opinion is thorough and well-reasoned.  There is no due process 
violation here.   
                                                 
3
 Contrary to Viola’s position before this Court, our prior decision returned the 
summary judgment motion to the District Court for additional analysis.  See 18B Charles 
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §4478.3 (2d ed.) (“[I]t 
is the court of appeals that has authority to determine what it meant [in its remand 
decision].”)  Viola’s argument that no motion filed by the Defendants was pending before 
the District Court is without merit. 
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IV.  Conclusion 
 We will affirm the decision of the District Court.  
